Distributional effects of water tariff reforms - an empirical study for Lima, Peru by Barde, Julia Alexa & Lehmann, Paul
www.ssoar.info
Distributional effects of water tariff reforms - an
empirical study for Lima, Peru
Barde, Julia Alexa; Lehmann, Paul
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Barde, J. A., & Lehmann, P. (2013). Distributional effects of water tariff reforms - an empirical study for Lima, Peru.
(UFZ Discussion Papers, 14/2013). Leipzig: Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-361681
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-SA Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Weitergebe unter gleichen
Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den
CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-SA Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Publisher: 
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung GmbH - UFZ 
Permoserstr. 15 
04318 Leipzig           ISSN 1436-140X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UFZ Discussion Papers 
 
Department of Economics 
14/2013 
 
 
 
Distributional Effects of Water Tariff Reforms –  
An Empirical Study for Lima, Peru 
 
 
 
 
Julia Alexa Barde, Paul Lehmann 
 
 
October 2013 
 
1 
 
Distributional Effects of Water Tariff Reforms –  
An Empirical Study for Lima, Peru 
Julia Alexa Bardea, Paul Lehmannb 1 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes the affordability and distributional implications of water tariff reforms 
for poor water customers under means-tested tariffs in comparison to increasing block tariffs 
(IBTs) using volumetric targeting. For this purpose, we employ a unique data set for Lima, 
Peru. Our analysis reveals that from a pro-poor perspective, the performance of means-tested 
tariffs is mixed. On the one hand, they distribute more income to poor households than the 
IBTs, given the assumption that the overall revenue to the water supplier remains constant. 
On the other hand, the share of poor customers who actually benefit from water subsidies 
declines with means-testing. Nevertheless, means-tested tariffs clearly outperform IBTs in 
terms of excluding non-poor customers from being subsidized. These findings should be 
generalized with care as the performance of the tariff crucially depends on the cut-off value 
for cross-subsidies and the block prices chosen under volumetric targeting and on the design 
of the means-test. Our analysis further suggests that a proper assessment of individual welfare 
effects should take household size into account and rest on a broad set of affordability and 
distributional indicators. Interestingly, our results are relatively insensitive to the price 
elasticity of water demand. 
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1 Introduction 
The individual welfare effects of water tariffs and corresponding reforms are an important 
concern of public policy in developing countries (UN, 2000; WMO, 1992). Especially, 
affordability of water supply is often understood as a precondition for making (necessary) 
increases in average tariff levels politically feasible (Batley, 2004; Fankhauser and Tepic, 
2007; Kaimowitz, 1996).2 The classical economic intuition advises against differentiating the 
price signal for the sake of distributional and affordability concerns.3 Instead, such concerns 
should be addressed by non-distorting income transfers which increase the ability-to-pay of 
poor households (see, e.g., Griffin, 2001). However, this strategy may not be implementable 
in developing countries, in which social transfer systems are often either absent or deficient 
(World Bank, 2000). Consequently, tariff discrimination is the major means to safeguard 
affordability in many countries throughout the world. The dominant approach are increasing 
block tariffs (IBTs) (Komives et al., 2005; OECD, 2009), with which the marginal price of 
water supply increases step-wise with the quantity of water consumed. This tariff scheme 
seems appealing for pro-poor targeting at first sight as water consumption is usually assumed 
to be linearly related to household income. Nevertheless, IBTs are nowadays commonly 
criticized for being insufficiently targeted to the poor. Inter alia, this is due to the fact that the 
relationship between water consumption and income may be less clear-cut in developing 
countries, where poor families are often significantly larger than wealthier ones and in many 
cases share connections with a joint meter. Moreover, IBTs also subsidize non-poor water 
users, for example, if these turn out to have low consumption levels or if the size of the first 
block is beyond subsistence consumption (Bithas, 2008; Boland and Whittington, 2000; 
Dahan and Nisan, 2007; Estache et al., 2002; Foster and Yepes, 2006; OECD, 2009; 
Whittington, 1992). As a response to these deficits, means-tested tariffs are increasingly 
proposed and have been implemented in some countries, such as Chile. They are expected to 
be better targeted to poor customers as the tariff discriminates on the basis of individual 
                                                 
2 For the sake of brevity, we will refer to the entire process of water extraction, transportation, and purification 
as well as of wastewater collection and treatment as water supply throughout our paper. 
3 Affordability of water supply may not only be warranted for distributional concerns but also for efficiency 
reasons if water consumption produces positive externalities in terms of improved health outcomes, reduced 
incidence of epidemics or reduced time spent on fetching water. In this case, the subsidized provision of a 
subsistence level of water supply may be economically first-best (Agthe and Billings, 1987; Hajispyrou et al., 
2002). For a broader discussion on pricing water supply see, for example, Griffin (2001). 
3 
 
welfare means (Foster et al., 2002a; Foster and Yepes, 2006; Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 
2003). However, the empirical evidence on the actual performance of means-tested tariffs is 
still limited. 
This study provides a quantitative assessment of the distributional effects of means-tested 
tariffs as compared to IBTs. We aim at examining how well the different tariff options are 
actually targeted to the poor and whether this affects affordability. For this purpose, we use a 
unique data set for the Metropolitan Area of Lima and Callao in Peru. It combines 
administrative data of the state-owned water and sanitation company SEDAPAL with socio-
economic data for the roughly 9 million people living in Lima obtained from a recent 
expenditure survey by the Peruvian Statistical Office. We compare the effects of the existing 
IBT to four alternative tariffs using different affordability and distributional measures and 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects. The latter take demand adjustments of 
households in reaction to price changes into account. Evaluating the effects of price reforms 
is particularly important in Lima where water supply is extremely scarce. Subsidizing 
households via water tariffs and thereby deviating from full-cost pricing, which a priori 
reflects scarcity, should be done - if so at all - with extreme care.  
Our analysis adds to the limited literature on distributional effects of water tariffs. A major 
strand of this literature bases its assessment on a consumer theory approach (Diakité et al., 
2009; Garcia and Reynauld, 2004; Groom et al., 2008; Hajispyrou et al., 2002; Renzetti, 
1992; Rietveld et al., 2000; Ruijs, 2009; Ruijs et al., 2008). Using water demand estimates, 
these studies examine changes in consumer surplus for different consumer groups and for 
alternative tariff options. Their focus lies on a comparison of IBTs and tariff schemes that are 
closer to the efficient pricing rule (uniform pricing combined with a fixed fee in most cases). 
The overall finding is that IBTs reduce overall social welfare but may increase the consumer 
surplus of poor customers (even though to different extents). A main problem of this 
literature with respect to our research question is that the data used rarely offers appropriate 
indicators to identify poor households. It also remains often at a highly aggregate level and 
uses, e.g., district average consumption levels of different income groups to quantify the 
effects. What is more, using the consumer theory approach for a developing country analysis 
is often difficult due to a lack of appropriate data needed for regression analysis (Nauges and 
Whittington, 2010). This constraint also applies to our analysis, so that we cannot compute 
surplus variations. We rely on a second strand of literature which proposes affordability and 
distributional measures assuming inelastic elasticity of demand to analyze the effects on poor 
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customers (Angel-Urdinola and Wodon, 2007; Foster et al., 2002a, b; Gómez Lobo and 
Contreras, 2003; Komives et al., 2006; Komives et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2000). 
Interestingly, these studies attenuate the above results, which attest a relatively good pro-poor 
performance of IBTs by allowing for more detailed insights into the redistribution of income 
than aggregated surplus variations. Our study goes beyond these analyses in several respects. 
First, we compare an IBT to (simulated) means-tested tariffs for the same water supplier, 
SEDAPAL, not across different utilities with different existing tariff schemes (Foster et al., 
2002a is the only exception). This allows us to reduce the distortion of our results by 
contextual factors and to examine a variety of alternative means-tested tariffs. Second, we 
apply a much broader set of indicators, including not only distributional measures but also 
affordability measures. Thereby, we are able to discuss methodological issues related to 
measuring affordability and distributional impacts. Third, we do not only look at impacts at 
the household level but also take household size and per capita figures into account. This step 
confirms many hypotheses on the poor performance of IBTs from the literature based only on 
household level analysis. Finally, we analyze to what extent our results are contingent on the 
assumed price elasticity of demand and hence try to close at least somewhat the gap to the 
surplus variation analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the affordability and 
distributional measures used. Section 3 describes the current situation in the Metropolitan 
Area of Lima and Callao. Section 4 presents the data we use and the calibration of the 
different tariff options. Section 5 presents and discusses our results. Section 6 concludes and 
offers policy recommendations.  
2 Measuring the Impact of Water Tariffs on Individual Welfare 
When it comes to measuring the impact of water tariffs on individual welfare, a general 
distinction can be made between affordability and distributional measures. Affordability 
measures aim at identifying who is poor in terms of water consumption and in need of being 
subsidized to be able to pay for water consumption. Distributional measures determine to 
what extent eligible households actually benefit from subsidies. Thus, they assess whether the 
direction of income redistribution is appropriate given that there are eligible customers. Both 
types of measures rest on normatively set poverty lines, either to define affordability or to 
define eligibility for subsidies. 
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2.1 Affordability Measures 
The most commonly used affordability measure is the Conventional Affordability Ratio 
(CAR) (see, e.g., Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). The corresponding burden ratio 𝑟𝑖 for a 
household 𝑖 relates expenditures for water supply, which compute as the (average) price of 
water 𝑝 times the consumed quantity 𝑞𝑖, to a household’s budget 𝑏𝑖, which may be 
interpreted as total income or total expenditures of the household: 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖 𝑏𝑖⁄ . 
The CAR may also be computed on a per capita basis relating individual water consumption 
to individual expenditures. An affordability issue arises when this ratio exceeds some 
normatively set threshold, which is typically set between two to five percent (Komives et al., 
2005). Gawel et al. (2013) show that this approach has important conceptual shortcomings as 
it does not account for relative preferences for water and other commodities and also neglects 
that even poor households may consume more water than necessary.  
To correct for these deficiencies, the Potential Affordability Ratio (PAR) is suggested (e.g., 
Foster and Yepes, 2006). To calculate the burden ratio 𝑟𝑖
𝑝, actual water consumption 𝑞𝑖 is 
replaced by a normatively set standard subsistence level 𝑞∗: 
𝑟𝑖
𝑝 = 𝑝𝑞∗ 𝑏𝑖⁄ . 
Typically, values for 𝑞∗ vary between 20 and 100 litres per capita and day (e.g., Howard and 
Bartram, 2003). The PAR traces affordability problems back to income constraints, i.e. only 
poor customers can have an affordability problem. The use of this second ratio may be 
difficult if political affordability concerns are not only motivated by concerns about poverty 
but more broadly by potential public resistance against water tariff reforms. In this case, the 
overall burden of water expenditures (as represented by the CAR) may be more relevant than 
the burden associated only with subsistence consumption (as represented by the PAR) (Gawel 
and Bretschneider, 2011).  
2.2 Distributional Measures 
Distributional measures rest on some exogenous welfare indicator based on income or a more 
complex welfare index, for which a poverty line is determined (e.g. the lowest quintile of the 
income distribution is defined as poor). They analyze whether and to what extent those water 
customers identified as poor by the poverty line actually benefit from the subsidies implicit in 
the tariff scheme. If one assumes that poor customers are more likely to have an affordability 
6 
 
problem, distributional measures provide insight into whether a tariff mitigates affordability 
issues. Distributional measures can be assessed on a household or per capita basis. The 
simplest measure is the absolute subsidy received or paid, which compares a household’s 
actual water expenditure to the true value of water consumption based on the average cost of 
water supply 𝑐: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑐𝑞𝑖 − 𝑝𝑞𝑖 
Based on these individual measures, simple aggregated indicators of beneficiary incidence 
can be constructed (Foster et al., 2002b; Komives et al., 2007). For this purpose, the total 
number of households 𝐻 connected to the network is divided into poor customers 𝑃 and non-
poor customers 𝑁𝑃. Likewise, the total number of subsidy beneficiaries 𝐵 (i.e. those 
households with 𝑠𝑖 > 0) is distinguished into poor 𝐵𝑃 and non-poor 𝐵𝑁𝑃. The error of 
exclusion 𝐸𝐸 specifies which share of the poor does not benefit from the subsidy: 
𝐸𝐸 = 1 − 𝐵𝑝 𝑃⁄  
To put this value into perspective, it may also be worthwhile to relate the number of the 
benefiting poor to the entire (connected and unconnected) poor population:  
𝐸𝐸� = 1 − 𝐵𝑃 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡⁄  
This ratio additionally includes the error of exclusion associated with the lack of network 
access. Moreover, the number of excluded poor customers may also be related to the total 
connected population to learn about the overall importance of the error of exclusion:  
𝐸𝐸� = �𝑃 − 𝐵𝑝� 𝐻⁄  
The error of inclusion 𝐸𝐼 illustrates which share of the subsidy beneficiaries is non-poor: 
𝐸𝐼 = 𝐵𝑁𝑃 𝐵⁄  
Here, it may again be insightful to relate the number of non-poor beneficiaries to the entire 
connected population to illustrate how universal or not the subsidy is: 
𝐸𝐼� = 𝐵𝑁𝑃 𝐻⁄  
Errors of exclusion and inclusion provide an idea of which households benefit but not of the 
actual extent of those benefits (Coady et al., 2004). This deficiency can be overcome by 
indicators of benefit incidence. The leakage rate assesses which share of the total volume of 
the positive subsidies goes to non-poor water costumers (Foster et al., 2002b): 
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𝐿𝑅 = 1 − 𝑆𝑃+ 𝑆+⁄  
where 𝑆𝑃+ = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑃𝑖=1  with 𝑠𝑖 > 0 denotes the aggregated positive subsidies received by the 
poor and 𝑆+ = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝐻𝑖=1  with 𝑠𝑖 > 0 overall positive subsidies received by all households. 
The benefit indicator Omega, 𝛺, assesses whether the average subsidy received or paid by 
one population group is lower (𝛺 < 1) or larger (𝛺 > 1) than the average subsidy received or 
paid by the population as a whole.4 In contrast to Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007), we 
distinguish Omega for positive and negative subsidies as well as for poor and non-poor 
customers. Table 1 provides the full definition of these Omegas. 
 
 
Table 1: Definitions of Omegas 
 
𝑆𝑃
− = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑃𝑖=1  with 𝑠𝑖 < 0 denotes negative subsidies to the poor. The aggregated positive and 
negative subsidies for non-poor customers, 𝑆𝑁𝑃+  and 𝑆𝑁𝑃− , compute correspondingly. If Omega 
is equal to one, subsidies are distributed as if randomly to the population. An Omega larger 
than one for positive subsidies qualifies the redistribution mechanism as progressive 
(regressive) when assessed for the poor (non-poor). The reverse holds true for the Omega for 
negative subsidies. Distinguishing between Omega for positive and negative subsidies allows 
detecting redistribution of income, which would not show up with an Omega for net subsidies 
if positive and negative subsidies within one group cancel out.  
                                                 
4 A further indicator is the Gini coefficient, which measures to what extent the distribution of a subsidy deviates 
from equal distribution (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2002b). We abstain from computing this indicator here as the 
resulting information of progressivity or regressivity of a subsidy is similar to that of the Omega. 
Poor Non Poor
positive subsidies
negative subsidies
Population group under consideration
Distribution of
𝛺𝑃
+ = 𝑆𝑃+ 𝑆+ ∙ 𝐻 𝑃⁄⁄ 𝛺𝑁𝑃+ = 𝑆𝑁𝑃+ 𝑆+ ∙ 𝐻 𝑁𝑃⁄⁄
𝛺𝑃
− = 𝑆𝑃− 𝑆− ∙ 𝐻 𝑃⁄⁄ 𝛺𝑁𝑃− = 𝑆𝑁𝑃− 𝑆− ∙ 𝐻 𝑁𝑃⁄⁄
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3 Water and Waste Water Tariffs in Lima 
The monopolistic, state-owned water and waste water firm SEDAPAL serves 1.81 million 
customers or roughly 90 percent of Lima’s population through its network. The remaining 
population is supplied by decentralized means of water supply, including water tankers and 
semi-centralized networks. Table 2 provides an overview of the tariff valid for SEDAPAL 
customers in 2011, the starting point of our analysis. The tariff has a two-part structure with a 
fixed and a variable charge. The variable charge is differentiated for drinking water and 
wastewater. The total amount billed in both categories is based on the volume of water 
consumed by each connection, i.e. the waste water quantity is assumed to be the same as the 
drinking water volume. The overall price per cubic meter is the sum of drinking and waste 
water price. Further, the variable charge distinguishes between customer types and volume 
categories. Private households, which account for 78 percent of SEDAPAL’s water 
consumption, are classified as residential customers. Non-residential customers include 
industrial, commercial, and government entities. The social tariff is paid, for example, by 
operators of public standpipes or poorhouses. Domestic, commercial, and industrial 
customers disposing of a water meter pay an IBT. Under this tariff, a customer’s monthly 
expenditures 𝑒𝑖 for water supply are computed as follows: 
𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓 + 𝑝𝑗−1 ∗ 𝑢𝑗−1 + 𝑝𝑗 ∗ �𝑞𝑖 − 𝑙𝑗� with 𝑙𝑗 < 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑗  and 𝑢𝑗−1 = 𝑙𝑗 
where 𝑓 is the fixed charge, 𝑝𝑗 is the price for block 𝑗, and 𝑙𝑗 and 𝑢𝑗  are the lower and upper 
consumption bounds of block 𝑗. That is, despite the four blocks, each consumer only faces 
two block prices: the price of the block into which the total consumption level falls and the 
price of the block below. Customers without a water meter, around 12.3 percent of all 
connected units, are assigned a fixed amount of consumption based on their class and 
category, the continuity of supply (in hours per day) and their place of residence (the 
wealthier the district they live in, the higher the assigned consumption). They thus pay a 
monthly flat rate for their water consumption. 
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Table 2: Water tariff valid in Lima from 6 June 2011 to 6 May 2012 
The water tariff in Lima is set by the Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios de Saneamento 
(SUNASS), the regulatory authority of the water sector. SUNASS calculates an average price 
which is supposed to cover average long-term costs of SEDAPAL. The current average price, 
or long-term average cost per cubic meter, is 2.57 for all customer types.5 Without the fixed 
charge per connection of 4.74 PEN, it is 2.48 PEN/m³. Considering just domestic customers, 
the variable average cost per cubic meter reduces to 1.74 PEN. As we focus on the 
distributional impact of pricing water for private households, 1.74 PEN/m³ is the benchmark 
for the following tariff analysis. Accordingly, all but the customers whose overall 
consumption volume falls into the fourth block get subsidies for at least part of their 
consumption.  
4 Empirical Approach 
4.1 Calibration of Tariff Options 
We analyze the individual welfare effects of five different tariff options for domestic 
customers. The calibration of these tariffs rests on several assumptions. First, we assume that 
the fixed charge as well as the tariffs for the social, commercial, industrial, and state 
                                                 
5 The long-term average unit cost covers investment by SEDAPAL and maintenance costs accruing from the 
SEDAPAL network. Apart from SEDAPAL, different bodies also invest into water and waste water 
infrastructure. These are, however, not included in the cost formula by SUNASS. The long-term average cost is 
thus not the true long-term average cost one would like to consider to understand whether the water tariff is 
financially sustainable.   
4.740
Customer 
class
Customer 
category
Range in m3 per 
month
Drinking water tariff in 
PEN per m3
Waste water tariff in 
PEN per m3
Social >0 0.940 0.411
0-10 0.940 0.411
10-25 1.091 0.477
25-50 2.414 1.055
>50 4.095 1.789
0-1000 4.095 1.789
>1000 4.392 1.919
State >0 2.294 1.002
Fixed charge in PEN per month and connection:
Variable charges:
Residential
Domestic
Non-
residential
Commercial and 
industrial
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categories remain constant throughout all options. Second, the overall level of revenue from 
water supply is assumed to be constant throughout all tariffs. Revenue sufficiency is an 
important concern of water suppliers and acceptance of tariffs reducing their revenue is 
hardly conceivable. Additionally, keeping revenue from domestic consumption constant 
allows comparing the distributional effects of the different tariffs as the sum of available 
subsidies is always the same. Overall monthly revenues of SEDAPAL amount to PEN 88.25 
million in 2011. The billed monthly volume of consumption is 34.37 million m3. Finally, we 
assume that individual consumption levels do not vary if tariffs change, i.e. consumption is 
perfectly inelastic to marginal price changes. Even though this assumption may seem very 
restrictive at first sight, empirical studies find that the price elasticity of water demand is 
usually below 1 in developing countries (Nauges and Whittington, 2010). We therefore feel 
reasonably safe to assume inelastic demand at least in the short run. We will relax this 
assumption later on.  
The tariffs we compare are summarized in Table 3 (note that drinking water and waste water 
tariffs are aggregated). We choose the options such that we can analyze a heterogeneous set 
of tariff designs and discuss possible trade-offs between distributional concerns and other 
criteria, such as economic efficiency and administrative simplicity. 
 
Table 3: Overview of tariff options (tariffs in PEN per m3) 
• IBT current is the tariff which was in place in Lima in 2011. It only incorporates 
volumetric price discrimination. All households which consume in the first, second or 
third block pay less than average costs in the domestic category (1.7426/m³) for either 
their total consumption (first and second block consumers) or for the first 25 cubic meters 
SISFOH Block m³ IBT current IBT rev IBT dif Uni 35 Uni 0
1 0-10 1.351 1.184
2 10-25 1.568 1.743
3 25-50 3.469 3.469 3.866
4 50-100 4.825
5 >100 5.884
1 0-10 1.351 1.184 1.240
2 10-25 1.569 1.743 1.509
3 25-50 3.469 3.469 2.481
4 >50 5.884 5.884 4.825
1 0-10 1.351 1.184 0.943
2 10-25 1.568 1.743 1.240
3 25-50 3.469 3.469
4 >50 5.884 5.884
Poor
0.620
0.000
1.988
Extremely Poor
0.000
2.233 1.988
Non Poor
1.509
1.910 1.988
5.884 5.884
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(third block consumers). Only households consuming more than 50 cubic meters pay 
more than average costs for their whole consumption. 
• IBT rev is a revised version of the existing tariff. The price for the second block is 
increased to the average costs of water supply in the domestic category. To maintain 
overall revenues constant, the price of the first block is slightly reduced. Thus, under this 
option, only consumption in the first block is subsidized. This option is included to 
compare the effect of setting different cut-off values for subsidies (25 m3 under IBT 
current and 10 m3 under IBT rev). 
• IBT dif is an increasing block tariff differentiated by individual welfare means. It 
combines volumetric and means-tested targeting. This tariff is currently discussed within 
SUNASS for a revision of SEDAPAL’s existing tariff. It is meant to provide for a better 
consideration of distributional concerns at the household level. The decision to propose 
such a hybrid tariff – instead of switching directly to purely means-tested tariff 
discrimination – may seem surprising at first sight. Volumetric targeting commonly is 
understood as an appropriate targeting mechanism if there is no other way to identify 
eligible households. If another targeting mechanism, such as a means-tested poverty 
indicator, is available at reasonable costs, economic rationale would advise to 
discriminate (if so at all) using different prices according to the means test. The decision 
by the Peruvian government and regulatory agency, however, may be explained 
politically. Radical tariff reforms may produce concerns and consequently opposition 
among stakeholders: The water utility may fear that it eventually ends up with less 
income. Water customers may be afraid that the tariff reform is employed to conceal 
tariff increases. Against this background, a hybrid tariff may be understood as a means to 
make gradual transition from an IBT to a purely means-test tariff discrimination 
politically feasible. 
 
In addition, we analyze a set of two uniform tariff options which primarily discriminate on 
the basis of individual welfare means:  
 
• UNI 35 allows for a rebate for customers classified as poor or extremely poor. They pay 
only around 35 percent of the average domestic tariff. The tariff for non-poor customers 
is beyond the average tariff to recover the subsidy to poor and extremely poor customers. 
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• UNI 0 exempts poor and extremely poor customers for the first 25 m3 from any charge 
and charges all poor and extremely poor customers with larger consumption volumes the 
same price per additional cubic meter as non-poor customers. It is the second hybrid tariff 
we analyze. 
In order to calibrate the alternative tariff options, we use a data set compiled for SUNASS by 
the Argentinian consultancy Centro de Estudios de Transporte e Infraestructura S.A. (CETI, 
2008). It matches SEDAPAL’s commercial database for September 2010 with the database of 
the Sistema de Focalización de Hogares (SISFOH), which provides the so-called SISFOH 
index for all connections. The means-tested income index SISFOH distinguishes between 
non-poor, poor, and extremely poor households and therewith identifies the three income 
groups which are part of the above tariff designs. SISFOH was created in 2004 by the 
Peruvian government as a monitoring tool to identify eligible persons for various social 
transfer programs administered by the government. It has been implemented since 2007 and 
identifies households using means-tested criteria based on household characteristics. 
SUNASS and SEDAPAL are now considering using it also for pro-poor targeting in water 
tariff design. Due to data constraints, SEDAPAL and SISFOH data could not be matched on 
an individual customer but only on a census block basis. That is, a customer’s poverty 
indicator is contingent on the classification of the block she lives in.6 We use the SEDAPAL 
data to calibrate the tariff schemes. Using administrative data for this step allows us to be 
sure that revenue neutrality is met. However, SEDAPAL's commercial data set only gives 
information on the quantity consumed, the total payment per month, and the SISFOH 
category of each connection.  
4.2 Data for the Analysis of Distributional Effects 
In order to analyze the distributional impact of different tariff scenarios, we use the 
expenditure survey Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) published by the national 
statistical office of Peru (INEI). It contains inter alia monthly expenditure data for drinking 
water for 2570 representative households in Lima in 2010. It enables us to calculate the 
quantity of water consumed per household using the SEDAPAL tariff scheme from 2010. 
Even though this information is also included in the commercial database provided by 
SEDAPAL, using ENAHO data has several advantages. First, we can link the volume of 
water consumption to the individual characteristics of the households, e.g. household size, 
                                                 
6 The full methodology used to match the two datasets is provided in CETI (2008). 
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which are not available from administrative data. Our study is the first to quantify the 
distributional effects at the individual level. Second, we are able to calculate two different 
income classifications from ENAHO data which allow analyzing the distributional effects of 
means-tested pricing and clarifying the crucial role of the choice of the poverty measure for 
the success of pro-poor pricing. The first income classification is the official poverty line of 
INEI distinguishing (as the SISFOH index) between "extremely poor", "poor", and "non-
poor" households. The second is the SISFOH index introduced above. Even though both 
indices use the same category names, the households identified to belong to each group are 
different for the two indices. While the SISFOH index is a means-tested indicator, poverty 
lines classify households according to income, or because data availability is often better, 
according to household expenditure. For Lima, the per capita poverty line for monthly 
expenditure are 159.62 PEN (extremely poor, 56.4 US$ in 2010) and 325.17 PEN (poor, 
114.9 US$ in 2010).7 This corresponds to 2 US$ a day per capita for extremely poor persons, 
and 4.1 US$ a day per capita for poor persons. The poverty line of extreme poverty lies 
within the first decile of the income distribution (0-306 PEN per capita and month) and the 
poverty line of non-extreme poverty lies within the second decile of the income distribution 
(306-376 PEN): In 2010, only 0.55 percent of the population in Lima had monthly incomes 
below the extreme poverty value, and only 12 percent had incomes below the non-extreme 
poverty line. The fact that we can find the SISFOH categories for each household from the 
ENAHO data allows us to apply the means-tested pricing schemes to the representative 
household data from ENAHO.8 We use monetary poverty as the "true" poverty indicator and 
discuss means-tested pricing of drinking water and waste water services referring to monetary 
income categories as reference groups. The choice of a specific poverty indicator to evaluate 
tariffs is purely normative, as is the choice of the indicator used to target subsidies, and we 
could have chosen any other index as a benchmark to evaluate means-tested pricing. Most 
studies mentioned in the introduction consider households in the lowest part of the income 
distribution to be poor (10-40 lowest percent of income distribution) and use this as a 
reference category to evaluate subsidy scheme performance. The cut-off value we choose for 
Lima is far lower. We discuss the implications of this choice for our results in section 5.2.  
                                                 
7 We use the exchange rate of 2.83 PEN/US$ published by the World Development Indicators 2010. The routine 
to calculate the poverty lines is provided by INEI with the 2010 version of ENAHO.  
8 See Appendix 1 for the methodology, questionnaires, and weighting for the SISFOH index calculation.  
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Whereas combining administrative and expenditure data allows a more precise analysis with 
respect to the determinants of redistributive performance of different tariff schemes, it is not 
free of problems. One potential source of impreciseness is that the calculation of the 
consumption volumes rests on the assumption that all water bills are based on metering as we 
use the 2010 SEDAPAL tariff to calculate the quantities from the total amount paid registered 
by the household expenditure survey. We cannot distinguish from the EHANO data between 
metered and non-metered households. As mentioned above, 13.2 percent of all water and 
waste water connections in Lima are not metered. Our analysis is therefore based on the ideal 
case of universal metering.9 Another problem may be that we cannot identify exactly the 
same households with ENAHO data that were identified by the matching of the 
administrative data with the SISFOH-categories. As explained above, this matching was done 
block-wise and not individually for each household, whereas we identify SISFOH-categories 
individually from ENAHO data. Further, but minor differences between the SISFOH 
procedure and ours are explained in the Appendix. Overall, we are confident that our 
identification comes close to reality: In the administrative data, 82.67 percent of the 
connections are categorized as non-poor, 16.44 percent as poor, and 0.88 percent as 
extremely poor. The equivalents of our SISFOH identification based on ENAHO data result 
in 88.18, 11.37 and 0.46 percent of total households, respectively. 
As we are interested in the redistribution effects of SEDAPAL tariffs, we restrict the original 
sample of around 2.21 million households to the 1.93 million households consuming drinking 
water from SEDAPAL for most of the following analysis. Except for the calculation of errors 
of exclusion and inclusion, we exclude all user groups that do not use an individual access 
point using SEDAPAL drinking water because we cannot calculate consumption volumes for 
shared or non-SEDAPAL connections. First, we exclude tank users. Even though tanks are 
usually under the concession of SEDAPAL, tank water is charged differently. Second, we 
exclude users who have access through a shared connection within their building as there is 
no information available about how users share their bill. Third, users getting their water 
from their neighbors are excluded as well. Presumably, neighbors sell their water at their 
own, probably much higher price. We include users of public fountains as the fountains are 
operated by SEDAPAL and only registered families are allowed to use them at prices of the 
first block. With these restrictions of the data set, 67.5 percent of the extreme poor and 73.8 
                                                 
9 Missing meters and therefore systematic assignment of consumption volumes applies to 89.2, 80.5 and 92 
percent of non-poor, poor and extremely poor connection units, respectively.  
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percent of the poor (according to INEI poverty lines) remain in our data set. 90.1 percent of 
the non-poor population are also connected individually to the SEDAPAL network. That is, 
the majority of the poor and non-poor would be affected by changes in the tariff structure. 
5. Results 
5.1 Is water poverty an issue at all? 
Table 4 illustrates that affordability of water supply is an issue if a relatively low threshold 
ratio (2 percent in our case) is chosen.10 If alleviating affordability via pro-poor pricing is a 
political goal, tariff discrimination may be justified in this case. However, for a threshold 
ratio of 5 percent, affordability problems almost disappear. As one would expect, 
affordability problems are much more prevalent among poor and extremely poor customers. 
However, at least according to the CAR, water may also be unaffordable for a significant 
share of non-poor customers. Moreover, the comparison of the PAR to the CAR yields 
interesting results. We chose 70 liters per day and per person as the minimum consumption 
volumes necessary to cover daily hygienic, drinking and cooking routines (see e.g. Breed & 
Breed, 2011). Affordability issues aggravate for extremely poor customers (with all of them 
facing a problem under some tariff options), while they are mitigated for poor customers and 
become irrelevant for non-poor customers. This implies that many extremely poor customers 
consume below subsistence levels and may therefore be identified as having no affordability 
constraint by the CAR. In contrast, many poor and non-poor customers over-consume and 
may therefore be identified as having an affordability problem under the CAR. The next 
sections inter alia analyze in how far affordability problems may be a result of distributional 
effects of different tariffs.  
                                                 
10 We display results at the household and the per capita level. With respect to affordability, results are more or 
less the same from the two perspectives. We discuss the role of household size for affordability and 
distributional effects separately in chapter 5.4.  
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Table 4: Share of connected water customers with affordability problems (share of water expenditures 
exceeds CAR/PAR of 2%/5%). Own calculations. 
5.2 How well are tariffs targeted to the poor? 
Distributional effects by any given pro-poor pricing will be driven by the targeting 
mechanism chosen to channel cross-subsidies to poor households. The tariff reforms we 
propose either imply volumetric targeting (IBT current, IBT rev), means-tested targeting 
(UNI 70, UNI 35), or hybrid targeting involving both mechanisms (IBT dif, UNI 0).  
Volumetric targeting as currently employed for Lima’s water tariff (IBT current) rests on the 
assumption that water consumption increases with income. An analysis of average 
IBT current IBT rev IBT dif Uni 35 Uni 0
CAR (     ) Share of households facing affordability problems
> 2% 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.30
> 5% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
by SISFOH
Extremely poor >2% 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.50
Poor >2% 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.44
Non-poor >2% 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.29
PAR (      )
> 2% 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
> 5% 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
by SISFOH
Extremely poor >2% 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.55 0.55
Poor >2% 0.29 0.16 0.22 0.44 0.50 
Non-poor >2% 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
CAR (     )
> 2% 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.26
> 5% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
by SISFOH
Extremely poor >2% 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.50 0.50
Poor >2% 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.42
Non-poor >2% 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.24
PAR (      )
> 2% 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
> 5% 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
by SISFOH
Extremely poor >2% 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.55 0.55
Poor >2% 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.44 0.50
Non-poor >2% 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Share of households facing affordability problems
Share of individuals facing affordability problems
Share of individuals facing affordability problems
𝒓𝒊
𝒓𝒊
𝒓𝒊
𝒑
𝒓𝒊
𝒑
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consumption in the three INEI income groups indicates that this assumption may actually 
hold in Lima: The extremely poor consume on average 10.92 m³ per month and household, 
the poor 12.72 m³, and the non-poor 16.71 m³, according to monetary poverty groups. This 
observation is at odds with most of the developing countries literature, which finds no major 
differences in consumption patterns for poor and non-poor households. Thus, at a per 
household basis and from a pro-poor perspective, IBT tariffs could a priori lead to better 
redistributive results in Lima than in other cities or countries in the developing world. This 
may be indicated by the relatively low error of exclusion (see Table 5): Only 10 percent of 
the connected poor customers (which corresponds to only 1 percent of all connected 
customers) do not receive a subsidy. However, the downside to this finding is the very high 
error of inclusion: 91 percent of the subsidy beneficiaries are non-poor. These constitute 78 
percent of the connected population. This result can be explained by the high cut-off line for 
subsidies of 25 m3, which dominates a potential progressive effect of the IBT structure that 
would in principle be possible in Lima. Figure 1 shows that most of the population in Lima 
lives in households consuming total volumes below 25m³ per month (block 1 and 2). This is 
not only true for the extremely poor and poor population, but also for the non-poor 
population. This part of the population only receives from the cross-subsidy scheme. Only 
0.84 percent of the non-poor persons live in households that do not receive any subsidies 
(block 4). Subsidy coverage is thus almost universal, the exact coverage only depending on 
the consumption levels of the 19.46 percent of population consuming between 25 and 50m³ 
(block 3). Figure 2 shows what happens in block 3 in the tariff IBT current. Consumers in 
this block get subsidies for the first 25m³ and pay into the system for all following cubic 
meters. Ultimately, households consuming more than 27.49m³ per month are net subsidy 
payers because from this volume on, negative subsidies net out positive subsidies. This 
compensating effect is a function of the price for the second and third block, or more 
generally of the prices for the two blocks around the cut-off. The errors of inclusion and 
exclusion effectively summarize the targeting performance with respect to net subsidies and 
are, in the case of IBTs, composed by targeting and pricing effects. 
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Table 5: Beneficiary incidence. Own Calculations. 
 
 
IBT current IBT rev IBT dif Uni 35 Uni 0
Errors per household
0.91 0.91 0.92 0.751 0.751
0.78 0.71 0.80 0.067 0.067
0.08 0.12 0.05 0.722 0.722
0.33 0.36 0.30 0.798 0.798
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.058 0.058
Errors per capita
0.89 0.88 0.89 0.659 0.659
0.74 0.68 0.75 0.053 0.053
0.10 0.14 0.08 0.745 0.745
0.34 0.36 0.30 0.812 0.812
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.079 0.079
Error of Inclusion Receivers (       )
Error of Inclusion Receivers (       )
Error of Exclusion Total (       )
Error of Exlusion Eligible nonSeda (       )
Error of Exclusion Eligible (       )
Error of Inclusion Total (       )
Error of Exclusion Total (       )
Error of Exlusion Eligible nonSeda (       )
Error of Exclusion Eligible (       )
Error of Inclusion Total (       )
𝐸𝐼
𝐸𝐼�
𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸�
𝐸𝐸�
𝐸𝐼
𝐸𝐼�
𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸�
𝐸𝐸�
Figure 1: Distribution of users over pricing blocks in Lima, Peru. Source: own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Compensating effect for water users consuming in the third block 
To correct for almost universal coverage, tariff IBT rev lowers the cut-off value to a 
subsistence level of 10m³, which has been proposed by the literature as an appropriate lifeline 
(Foster et al., 2006).11 In contrast to what one would expect, however, this modification 
hardly affects the performance of the IBT in terms of beneficiary incidence. The explanation 
is again linked to the compensation effect which is now materializing immediately in the 
third block. All non-poor households in block 1 and 2 are still in the numerator of the errors 
of inclusion. Consumers in block 2, however, do not get subsidies anymore. All households 
consuming in the third block but below 27.49m³ also become net payers. Only the share of 
those customers who are non-poor is however excluded from the errors of inclusion. As 
expected, the error of inclusion with respect to total connected households decreases 
somewhat. Since the numerator and denominator of the error of inclusion in total receivers 
are both affected by the change and the denominator decreases more than the numerator, this 
error even increases somewhat. This effect appears as long as the volumetric targeting 
excludes poor households from receiving net subsidies and not only non-poor customers. 
                                                 
11 This comes close to the 70 liters per day and capita that we assumed above: An average poor household in 
Lima with 6 members consumes 12.6m³ if this minimum volume is applied. 
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However, an increase of the error of inclusion in such a situation gives a confusing signal 
with respect to what the indicator should measure: Effectively, more non-poor customers are 
excluded from receiving net subsidies than before. This is adequately reflected by the error of 
inclusion in total population, which, however, misses the fact that the share of non-eligible 
customers in total receivers has increased. It is thus important to consider both errors together 
in order to fully understand the targeting effect of volumetric targeting. Both errors of 
exclusion increase as the poor in the third block now also become net payers. However, this 
share is too small to affect the errors of exclusion significantly. The CARs in Table 4 show 
that decreasing the lifeline while reducing the first block price and setting the second block 
price equal to average costs does not increase the affordability problems of the poor and 
extreme poor at current consumption levels.     
Table 5 illustrates that switching to a purely means-tested targeting mechanism (UNI 35) 
brings about a clear trade-off: On the one hand, the error of inclusion is significantly reduced 
compared to IBT current. On the other hand, the error of exclusion drastically increases. This 
trade-off is directly linked to the suitability of the welfare index in place to target the poor 
and extremely poor as uniform tariffs don't bring about compensating effects. Table 6 shows 
that the SISFOH index (MT, Means-tested poverty) and the INEI index (Monetary poverty) 
mostly overlap for the non-poor population: 93 percent of the non-poor (INEI) are also 
identified as non-poor by the means test. 6.52 and 0.18 percent of the individuals classified as 
non-poor by monetary considerations receive subsidies according to means-tested targeting, 
suggesting relatively low errors of inclusion. For the two poor categories, poor and extremely 
poor individuals, targeting is less accurate. 19.78 percent of the extremely poor and 66.30 
percent of the poor cannot be reached by means-tested targeting. These facts are also 
illustrated by the affordability measures (see Table 4). In fact, the extremely poor still benefit 
(in terms of CAR as well as PAR) from switching to a means-tested tariff. In contrast, the 
result for the poor is either indifferent (CAR) or significantly worse (PAR). This suggests that 
the increased exclusion from subsidies is primarily to be faced by the poor, not by the 
extremely poor. In comparison to the IBT effects on the PAR, it gets clear that the poor suffer 
from the high prices under uniform tariffs even if consumption volumes are reduced to the 
strict minimum of 70 liters per day and capita. This goes back to the missing attenuating 
effect of volumetric targeting. Under an IBT tariff, a poor customer who is not correctly 
identified by the cut-off value still benefits from lower prices in the lower blocks as long as 
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her total consumption volume does not fall into the fourth block. That is, a mismatch in 
targeting hits the poorer harder under means-tested uniform tariffs.  
 
Table 6: Income Categories and Water Consumption in Lima, ENAHO (2010): own calculations. 
Lastly, we find that the hybrid approaches do not perform any better in terms of targeting. 
The hybrid approach of IBT dif hardly affects the errors of exclusion and inclusion as 
compared to IBT current. This seems to indicate that the bias of volumetric targeting (high 
cut-off value) dominates the attenuating effect that means-tested targeting would introduce to 
this tariff. In fact, poor and extremely poor customers with consumption levels above 25m³ 
are barely existent (10.5 percent of the poor), and price reductions for volumes below 25m³ 
are rather small. Also with the second hybrid tariff, UNI 0, the targeting effect of the main 
targeting mechanism, means-tested targeting in this case, dominates. As most of the poor and 
extremely poor consume in blocks 1 and 2 and the compensating effect above 25m³ only 
emerges for extremely high consumption levels, which are basically not realized by poor and 
extremely poor households, the volumetric component effectively has no impact on the 
errors.12  
Summing up the discussion of targeting mechanisms and beneficiary incidence, we can say 
that, given the price and targeting design chosen in this study, volumetric targeting leads to 
almost universal subsidization because of the high lifeline. Means-tested pricing performs 
better in this respect because its targeting excludes most of the non-poor from receiving net 
                                                 
12 The errors of exclusion that we present here are calculated for the population of SEDAPAL clients. That is, 
persons living in households without access to an official SEDAPAL connection are not taken into account. 
Including poor and extreme poor persons without access increases the errors of exclusion (share in eligible 
households): 0.34, 0.37, 0.33, 0.79, 0.79, 0.79 (in the order of the table). These values take into account who has 
access to water connection and who has not - this may be a function of the pricing system at hand, but may also 
be related to other factors, such as prohibitively high uptake costs or missing access to the grid at the place of 
residence.  
Extr. Poor Poor Non Poor
0.11 8.90 90.99 100
19.78 66.30 93.30 89.65%
4.16 39.24 56.60 100
76.47 32.85 6.52 10.07%
9.20 36.03 54.77 100
4.74 0.85 0.18 0.28%
0.55% 12.03% 87.43%
100 100 100
Total
MT Poverty
Total
Monetary Poverty
Non Poor
Poor
Extr. Poor
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subsidies. However, it also excludes most of the poor and extremely poor users from any 
subsidies. Interestingly, the two hybrid schemes and the tariff with the lower lifeline do not 
perform better.  
5.3 How strongly is income redistributed among poor and non-poor? 
Table 7 illustrates the pattern of income redistribution via tariff reforms distinguishing 
between the pattern of contributions to and benefits from the system of cross-subsidies. As 
we have discussed targeting problems linked to missing access above, we focus on customers 
connected to the SEDAPAL network in this section.  
With respect to the benefits from the system (𝛺 +), all tariffs but the current IBT are 
progressive with respect to extremely poor and poor households. The means-tested tariffs, 
however, redistribute more strongly towards both groups.13 With respect to the contributions 
to the system (𝛺 −), all tariffs again fulfill progressive redistribution, however, this time the 
means-tested tariffs perform worse. Due to the targeting issues discussed above, especially 
with the means-tested tariffs, not all poor and extremely poor households are exempt from 
contributing to the system. Interestingly, all tariff options are relatively neutral to the non-
poor households. That is, the share of subsidies contributed to the system by the net payers 
among the non-poor households is almost as big as the share that the net receivers among the 
non-poor households get from the system. Additionally, the share of the non-poor subsidies 
in total positive or negative subsidies is almost of the same size, compared to their share in 
population, i.e. the redistribution among them is as if random. Only the means-tested tariffs 
reduce the share received by non-poor households. This result is also underpinned by the 
leakage rate. Around 90 percent of the positive subsidies are allocated to non-poor 
households with IBT tariffs, 62 percent with the means-tested tariffs. This reflects the high 
errors of inclusion of all targeting mechanisms. Lastly, the pattern of income redistribution is 
not affected by the hybrid pricing schemes. IBT Dif performs clearly better than the other two 
IBTs but does not reach the redistribution implemented by the means-tested tariffs. UNI 0 
again has no differential effect. 
                                                 
13 Note that the nominator of the Omegas is always composed by the share of subsidies of those receiving (or 
paying) net subsidies, whereas the denominator contains the whole population in the subgroup. If extreme poor 
receive 1.5 times as much subsidies as their share in total population, this only affects those extreme poor who 
effectively receive net subsidies. The errors of exclusion still apply and not all poor benefit from this share in 
total subsidies.  
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Table 7: Benefit Incidence. Own Calculations. 
Table 7 shows the materiality of the tariffs which completes the analysis of benefit incidence. 
The fact that the average net subsidy per household received by the non-poor is positive for 
the IBTs further underlines that they heavily redistribute towards non-poor households. The 
hybrid IBT Dif allocates by far the largest net subsidies to all three income groups. The 
means-tested tariffs, in contrast, take on average from the non-poor households, which 
reconfirms the positive Omegas below 1 and the negative Omegas above 1 in Table 7. As 
with the affordability ratios and negative Omegas, the average net subsidies of poor 
households under means-tested tariff schemes show that these tariffs favor the extreme poor 
more than the poor.  
IBT current IBT rev IBT Dif Uni 35 Uni 0
Omegas per household 
Receiver of subsidies
Extremely poor (          ) 1.15 1.40 4.87 11.78 11.84
Poor (        ) 0.98 1.06 1.48 4.55 4.52
Non-poor (          ) 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.67 0.67
Payers of Subsidies
Extremely poor (         ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.28
Poor (       ) 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.64 0.64
Non-poor (          ) 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.03 1.03
Omegas per capita
Receiver of subsidies
Extremely poor (          ) 0.80 0.97 3.10 8.19 8.24
Poor (        ) 0.73 0.80 1.11 3.42 3.40
Non-poor (          ) 1.03 1.02 0.98 0.69 0.69
Payers of Subsidies
Extremely poor (         ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20
Poor (       ) 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.48 0.48
Non-poor (          ) 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.06
Leakage Rate (        ) 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.62 0.62𝑳𝑹
𝛺𝐸𝑃
+
𝛺𝑃
+
𝛺𝑁𝑃
+
𝛺𝐸𝑃
−
𝛺𝑃
−
𝛺𝑁𝑃
−
𝛺𝐸𝑃
+
𝛺𝑃
+
𝛺𝑁𝑃
+
𝛺𝐸𝑃
−
𝛺𝑃
−
𝛺𝑁𝑃
−
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5.4 What is the impact of household size? 
One aspect that we have not discussed so far is the impact of household size on our results. 
Several of the indicators that we present show that taking household size into account 
considerably attenuates the results with respect to the progressivity of the different tariff 
options.14 Most importantly, the two purely volumetrically targeted tariffs (IBT current, IBT 
rev) are clearly regressive or close to neutral at the per capita level with respect to the 
distribution of positive net subsidies (Table 8). The other tariff options remain in the same 
order from the pro-poor perspective, however, they all lose some of their progressivity. All 
positive Omegas decrease by roughly the same percentage (30 percent for the extremely poor, 
25 percent for the poor), so that household size does not affect the distributional effects of the 
tariffs differently (Table 7). The only exception is the IBT Dif indicator which decreases by 
36 percent for the extremely poor. The two pure IBTs were already close to neutral at the 
household level and are therefore the first here to change into a regressive pattern. This result 
is further reinforced by the average net subsidies per capita (Table 8). We calculate the ratio 
of average net subsidies of poor (extremely poor) to average net subsidies of non-poor.15 This 
ratio decreases with all three IBT tariffs from the household to the per capita level. Again, the 
                                                 
14 Average household size per monetary poverty group is 6.17 in extremely poor households, 5.98 in poor 
households and 4.66 in non-poor households. 
15 Note the change of interpretation of this indicator with its change in sign. A positive ratio shows how many 
times the poor or extreme poor receive what the non-poor receive. A negative ratio, however, can be read as 
how much the poor or extreme poor receive what the non-poor contribute.  
 
Table 8: Average net subsidies in PEN per month. Own Calculations 
IBT current IBT rev IBT dif Uni 35 Uni 0
Extremely poor 3.97 5.32 23.64 6.68 10.43
Poor 2.90 3.29 6.50 1.22 1.99
Non-poor 1.34 1.07 1.62 -2.23 -3.23
Poor/Non-poor 2.16 3.07 4.02 -0.55 -0.62
Extremely poor/Non-poor 2.96 4.96 14.63 -2.99 -3.23
Extremely poor 0.68 0.92 3.62 1.15 1.80
Poor 0.54 0.61 1.17 0.23 0.37
Non-poor 0.34 0.27 0.40 -0.57 -0.82
Poor/Non-poor 1.57 2.24 2.93 -0.40 -0.45
Extremely poor/Non-poor 2.00 3.35 9.06 -2.02 -2.18
Average net subsidies per household (      )
Average net subsidies per capita (      )
𝒔𝒊
𝒔𝒊
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decreases are equal for all tariffs (32 percent for the extremely poor, 27 percent for the poor) 
but IBT Dif (38 percent for the extremely poor, 27 percent for the poor). Overall, the per-
capita analysis reinforces the results at the household level and importantly adjusts the picture 
with respect to IBT current and IBT rev. The fact that the IBT Dif indicators decrease by even 
more than the other tariffs highlights the complexity of the targeting structure at work with 
this tariff. The loss of progressivity under IBT can be due, in total, to three different factors: 
the price level, the cut-off volume and (for IBT Dif) the means test. The means test or the 
combination of the means test and one or both of the two other factors interact with the 
pattern of consumption levels for different household sizes under IBT Dif, so that the 
reduction is larger with IBT Dif. Importantly, it would be wrong to conclude that it is only the 
means test that acts against larger poor households here.  The change in price levels from IBT 
current to IBT Dif in combination with the means tests or the means test in combination with 
the cut-off value can also exclude poor families from subsidies. The uncertainty about the 
exact underlying reason for this effect highlights the complexity of the combination of 
different targeting mechanisms within one tariff and generally speaks in favor of simple tariff 
schemes where the effects are clearly understandable just from the design of the tariff.  
5.5 What is the impact of price elasticity of demand? 
So far, we assumed that demand is inelastic with respect to price changes. However, this 
might not be true in the long run. Nauges and Whittington (2010) review the evidence on 
price elasticities estimated with data from developing countries and find that estimated 
elasticities vary between -0.3 and -0.6 for private connections. In the following, we simulate 
the quantity adjustment to price changes from the current IBT to the UNI 35 tariff assuming 
elasticities of -0.3 and -0.8 in order to find out whether the assumption of inelastic demand 
determines our results. As the change in the average affordability and distributional indicators 
discussed above is quite small for -0.3, the latter value is higher than the upper bound from 
the literature to provoke sizeable changes. Table 9 shows the price changes in percent and the 
resulting quantity adjustments per block and income group. Even though the size of some of 
the changes seems quite unrealistic, no change leads to dramatic changes in the indicators. 
Table 10 shows the results for the distributional indicators and the conventional affordability 
rates at a per capita basis.16  
                                                 
16 The errors of inclusion and exclusion are not affected by the quantity adjustments, the potential affordability 
ratios deliberately ignore quantitative adjustments. 
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Table 9: Price change when switching from IBT current to Uni 35 and resulting quantity changes for 
different price elasticities of demand. Own calculations. 
 
Table 10: Comparison of affordability and distributional indicators for different price elasticities of 
demand. Own calculations. 
0-10 1.3511 41.37 -12.41 -33.10
10-25 1.568 21.82 -6.55 -17.45
25-50 3.469 -44.94 13.48 35.95
50-100 5.884 -67.54 20.26 54.03
>100
0-10 1.3511 -54.10 16.23 43.28
10-25 1.569 -60.48 18.14 48.38
25-50 3.469 -82.12 24.64 65.70
>50 5.884 -89.46 26.84 71.57
0-10 1.3511 -54.10 16.23 43.28
10-25 1.568 -60.45 18.14 48.36
25-50 3.469 -82.12 24.64 65.70
>50 5.884 -89.46 26.84 71.57
Quantity 
change   
(%, -0.3)
Quantity 
change     
(%, -0.8)
Poor
0.6201
Extremely Poor
Price 
change (%)
Non Poor 1.9101
SISFOH m³ IBT current Uni 35
IBT current Uni 35 Uni 35 Ela -
0.3
Uni 35 Ela -
0.8
Affordability CAR (     )
> 2% 0.18 0.25 0.24 0.23
 > 5% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
by SISFOH
PE >2% 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.63
P >2% 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.34
NP >2% 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.21
Extremely poor 0.68 1.15 1.37 1.73
Poor 0.54 0.23 0.33 0.47
Non-poor 0.34 -0.57 -0.56 -0.54
Poor/Non-poor 1.57 -0.40 -0.59 -0.88
2.00 -2.02 -2.46 -3.21
Omegas per capita
0.80 8.19 8.15 8.33
0.73 3.42 3.44 3.45
1.03 0.69 0.69 0.68
0,00 0.20 0.18 0.15
0.18 0.48 0.46 0.44
0.10 1.06 1.07 1.07
Share of individuals facing affordability problems
Average net subsidies per capita (       )
Extremely poor/Non-poor
Poor (       )
Non-poor (          )
Receiver of subsidies
Extremely poor (          )
Poor (        )
Non-poor (          )
Payers of Subsidies
Extremely poor (         ) 
𝒓𝒊
𝒔𝒊
𝛺𝐸𝑃
+
𝛺𝑃
+
𝛺𝑁𝑃
+
𝛺𝐸𝑃
−
𝛺𝑃
−
𝛺𝑁𝑃
−
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The simulated quantity reaction of a household to price changes is simply the product of past 
consumption volumes, the price change and the elasticity of the respective block and income 
group of the household in question. Obviously, this is a very pragmatic way to interpret 
average estimates of point elasticities. Additionally, the estimation of elasticities under IBT 
pricing schemes brings about some methodological issues that further handicap the 
simulation of quantity reactions. These need to be kept in mind when analyzing the results. 
First, the usual assumption for estimation is that the marginal prices of all blocks increase 
equally by 1 percent (Olmstead et al., 2007). It is obvious from Table 9 that this is not true for 
the tariff switches considered in this study. Even if this was the case, the average price 
change over all blocks would need to be taken into account for simulation as well. It would 
lead to a change in virtual income, which would reduce the estimated reaction to price 
decreases as income elasticity estimates are usually estimated to be positive.17 However, the 
impact of a change in virtual income may be small here, as income elasticity estimates are 
even smaller than price elasticities and mostly insignificant in most studies from developing 
countries (Nauges and Whittington, 2010). Second, there is evidence that price elasticities 
differ according to the price scheme studied. Under uniform pricing, elasticity seems to be 
somewhat lower than under IBT schemes (Olmstead et al., 2007); note that we consider a 
switch from one type to the other. A third complication results from the fact that even though 
there are estimators and methodologies to estimate unconditional elasticities for IBT schemes 
(see e.g. Olmstead et al., 2007), these are not applied in developing countries' studies due to a 
lack of data. That is, the elasticity range of [-0.3,-0.8] only applies to quantity adjustments 
conditional on remaining within the same consumption block. This is another assumption that 
does not hold for all households in our study. Due to these issues, the correct use and 
interpretation of the results of the large literature on elasticity estimation is difficult if not 
unfeasible in the absence of own panel data. Nevertheless, if considered with caution, the 
simple simulation provides some insights.  
Only the (SISFOH) non-poor households consuming below 25m³ face price increases. This 
leads to decreasing affordability problems at the two percent expenditure threshold in 
general, as this group is the majority of the customers, but also in the specific group as such. 
The price increase seems to be netted out by quantity adjustments. This result either 
materializes because of or is reinforced by the mistargeting of the means test which applies to 
                                                 
17 See Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) for a short but very recent discussion of whether households react to 
marginal price changes of "their" block or of the blocks below or to average price changes of all blocks at once.  
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around 9 percent of the non-poor customers. Affordability problems at the 2 percent level for 
extremely poor households increase strongly, the opposite is true for poor households, who 
see their affordability problems decrease. In the two groups of extremely poor and poor 
customers, the matching of the two poverty indicators is worse. Hence, the effect of quantity 
and price changes is even more biased by mistargeting, which leads to price increases for 
poor and extremely poor households classified as non-poor. The average net subsidies for the 
extreme poor and poor increase with the quantity adjustment. Again, the poor benefit most: 
their average net subsidy increases by (rounded) 43 percent (-0.3) or 104 percent (-0.8), 
whereas the average net subsidy of the extremely poor increases by 19 or 50 percent, 
respectively. The sharp increase for the poor is reflected by the fact that with an elasticity of -
0.8, the poor now receive more than the non-poor contribute to the cross-subsidizing system 
at the household level (not shown). However, at the per capita level the poor still receive less 
than the non-poor contribute. This again highlights the role of per capita considerations, even 
though, as above with inelastic demand, the ranking of the tariffs is not affected by the switch 
from household to per capita levels. The last indicator that is affected by the quantity 
adjustments is the distributional incidence (Omega).18 It is surprising that the changes in the 
average indicator are very small, even negligible, even though the changes at the individual 
level discussed beforehand are quite dramatic. This means that the overall increase of for 
example positive subsidies in the system is divided relatively equally into increases of 
positive subsidies for the three income groups (here the increase is around 16-17 percent of 
the total subsidies with the original UNI 35 tariff). Another interesting result is that the 
negative effects on poor customers that we found in the inelastic analysis are attenuated by 
the quantity reactions.  
6. Conclusion 
We examine the individual welfare effects of water tariff reforms. Our particular interest lies 
in understanding affordability and distributional implications for poor water customers under 
volumetric and means-tested targeting. For this purpose, we compare five tariff options for 
                                                 
18 Note that the per household and per capita Omegas will change exactly by the same percentage as the 
denominator is the only difference between Omega per household and Omega per capita. The denominator, the 
share of households (individuals) in total households (population), does not change in this simulation. We only 
display the Omega per capita.  
29 
 
water supply in Lima, Peru, which either apply one or a combination of the two targeting 
mechanisms. 
It is not entirely clear which tariff performs best. First, under any of the tariff options, 
affordability is an issue for between 20 to 30 percent of the households if the critical share of 
total water expenditures in income is set at 2 percent. At a 5 percent threshold, there is no 
problem for all of the tariffs. If only the expenditures for subsistence consumption are 
considered (instead of total expenditures), our analysis highlights that the affordability 
problem only remains for extremely poor households as they are subject to true budget 
constraints. Second, also the distributional results provide an ambiguous picture from a pro-
poor perspective – even though all tariffs except the current IBT and its slightly adjusted 
variation are progressive. On the one hand, uniform means-tested tariffs clearly perform 
better in terms of a progressive redistribution of income: The non-poor contribute to the 
system, the poor and extremely poor benefit, and the latter more so. On the other hand, a 
hybrid approach combining the currently existing IBT with means-tested targeting clearly 
redistributes the largest average subsidy to the extremely poor. However, it also allocates the 
largest average subsidy to non-poor customers. Generally, all tariffs allow for important 
redistribution among non-poor customers, which is clearly inefficient and scales down the 
potential scope for pro-poor pricing. The means-tested tariffs partly address this problem, the 
hybrid IBT is worst in this respect. Third, it is important to bear the errors of exclusion and 
inclusion in mind. When volumetric targeting is replaced by means-tested targeting, the share 
of non-poor customers receiving subsidies declines while the share of poor customers 
excluded from subsidies increases. This leads to the highlighted advantage of means-tested 
uniform tariffs in terms of redistribution among those who are still in the system, but also 
puts this gain into perspective as the share of those eligible and benefiting decreases. Lastly, 
the performance of hybrid approaches combining both targeting mechanisms hinges on the 
questions which mechanism dominates. Thus, they only do as good (or bad) as the dominant 
targeting approach on its own.  
Overall, the analysis makes clear that one should be careful with generalizing any of these 
findings speaking against or in favor of one particular tariff scheme. First of all, the specific 
details of designing the targeting mechanism, i.e. the cut-off value for cross-subsidies, the 
block prices, the means test and the decision how to combine these within one tariff scheme, 
are decisive for the actual income redistribution. What is more, the results also crucially 
depend on the consumption pattern of consumers. These are a function of local environments. 
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In our context, household size has proven to be especially decisive, and our study is the first 
to show this effect quantitatively. However, this is the only (actionable) result from the 
literature about consumption patterns that informs the debate about pro-poor tariff design so 
far. Further research is clearly needed. A generalizable result is that understanding and, most 
important for policy advice, predicting the effects of IBTs is clearly more complex than with 
uniform means-tested tariffs because IBTs combine most of the aforementioned design 
factors. The interplay of tariff design and local consumption patterns may even make IBTs 
unusable for clear-cut policy measures.  
Our analysis yields some further methodological results. Some of the indicators frequently 
used have to be interpreted with care. For example, the interpretation of the error of exclusion 
under volumetric targeting is ambiguous as it is a function of the cut-off value and the price 
structure chosen for an IBT (compensating effect). Therefore, the error does not only say 
something about targeting alone but also about price effects. In addition, using only the error 
of inclusion in total receivers can also be confusing as it can increase even if the share of non-
eligible households getting subsidies decreases. These findings highlight the necessity to 
always employ a broad set of indicators to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
performance of tariffs from a pro-poor perspective. This is further reinforced by the 
ambiguous results discussed above. Evaluating the distributional measures without the errors 
of exclusion and inclusion would point to another conclusion than considering just the errors 
or the distributional measures. Ultimately, it is a policy decision to weigh the results against 
each other and to decide what is more important as a policy goal in the specific country or 
city in question. Further, we propose to closer analyze redistribution within and not only 
across groups, as well as to separate access factors from targeting analysis. These two aspects 
have not been taken into account by previous literature and lead to important additional 
insights. Finally, the price elasticity of demand hardly affects the average affordability and 
distributional performance of tariffs in our case, even though the changes at the individual 
level in terms of price and quantity changes faced by the customers are huge. This aspect 
clearly needs more research as our case study is the first to clearly demonstrate the dichotomy 
of results.  
Deriving policy recommendations for tariff design in Lima against this background is 
challenging. From a pro-poor perspective, it is ambivalent whether it is preferable to make 
more poor and extremely poor customers receive subsidies (as under volumetric targeting 
with the current IBT tariff) or to increase the transfers to those poor actually subsidized to 
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effectively mitigate affordability problems (as under a means-tested tariff). However, it is 
clear that a simple means-tested tariff will outperform the IBT tariff as soon as the underlying 
welfare indicator is improved, i.e. as soon as the SISFOH approach is replaced by an 
indicator better reflecting customers’ true income situation. Moreover, the fact that a means-
tested tariff reduces the error of inclusion may be beneficial from a pro-poor perspective in 
the long term. It provides that a higher share of the population faces stronger incentives to 
reduce water consumption and water scarcity may be mitigated. Thus, the long-run costs of 
water supply may be lower than under a scenario with rather universal subsidization as with 
the current IBT. The analysis of the means-tested tariffs further shows that differentiating 
prices between poor and extremely poor household brings about undesirable results 
especially for the poor as the means test cannot clearly distinguish between the two in Lima. 
Combing an IBT with means-testing – as currently proposed by Peru’s regulatory agency – 
does not bring about significant benefits for poor and extremely poor customers. Even if it 
may be true that such a tariff is politically easier to implement than a direct switch to a 
uniform means-tested tariff, this is clearly not due to the real effects of the tariffs. Eventually, 
if deviation from efficient pricing is deemed to be absolutely necessary to help the poor and 
extremely poor to afford their daily water consumption, promoting an improved means-test as 
the better pro-poor element in combination with a uniform tariff is warranted.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Questionnaire for SISFOH categorization (Ficha Socioeconómica Unicá, FSU) (CETI, 
2008) 
The FSU (see figure below) is part of the identification of poor and extremely poor 
households in Peru. The whole identification process consists of three parts (CETI, 2008). 
The first step identifies poor neighborhoods from census data (currently Census 2005) 
according to the dominant features of housing in the neighborhood (housing material, water 
and sanitation services, household size per room). In a second step, a survey following the 
FSU is completed for all neighborhoods which could not be identified as clearly poor by the 
criteria in the first step. Households who think that they are poor but live in a census district 
classified as rich can apply for re-categorization. In the third, households are allocated 
weighted points according to their answers and the FSU weighting scheme (see below). 
Households are then put into the seven different SISFOH categories according to their total 
points in the questionnaire. SISFOH 1 and 2 correspond to the category Extremely Poor and 
are composed by the first two deciles of the FSU point distribution, SISFOH 3 to 5 
correspond to the categorie Poor (deciles 3 to 5) and SISFOH 6 and 7 (deciles 6 to 10) 
correspond to Non-poor.  
As all the items of the FSU questionnaire are also questions within the ENAHO expenditure 
survey, we can construct the SISFOH categories without having access to the original FSU 
survey. As we miss the first step, our procedure rests on the assumption that all poor 
households in rich census districts were re-catogerized after the initial identification. We 
cannot correct for rich households categorized as poor or extremely poor in the first step by 
the original SISFOH procedure who probably won't apply for re-classifcation. Using 
ENAHO data, these households will be identified as non-poor for our analysis. 
Unfortunately, official figures for the classification in Lima are not available, so that we 
cannot compare our results to the ones by the official procedure.   
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Figure 3: FSU questionnaire and weighting scheme (CETI, 2008) 
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A.2 Comparison of SISFOH and INEI poverty identification  
Means-tested poverty categories and monetary poverty lines reflect completely different 
concepts of how to measure poverty and also imply different processes and costs. Calculating 
expenditure for each and every household as it is done to classify households according to the 
INEI poverty lines for the representative ENAHO sample is by far more complex than the 
means testing SISFOH approach. Poverty lines use very detailed expenditure data to calculate 
household expenditure. This includes pricing self-production of goods and services a priori 
not valued by market prices and comparing expenditure levels to the expenditures needed to 
satisfy basic nutritional needs in the specific area where the household lives. Because of the 
complexity of these processes, interviews are only done with a small and representative 
sample of households. Means-tested approaches as the SISFOH indicator have been 
introduced to enable an administratively easier and cheaper identification of eligible 
households for social programs. As detailed above, the SISFOH indicator is constructed by 
using interview information from each and every household. The items asked include the type 
of housing (walls, floors), the set of public services accessed by the household (water, waste 
water collection, electricity, insurance), and other household characteristics decisive for its 
means to avoid poverty (education, employment, age, etc). Even if the list includes around 20 
questions and several answer options for each question, the questions are easy to answer and 
the answers easy to verify by the interviewer. It is obvious from this that a means-tested 
procedure is more realistic in terms of costs and time needed in order to identify potential 
beneficiaries of social benefits. It is, however, debatable what variables should compose the 
means test and how they should be weighted. Comparing the procedures that have been 
discussed in Peru (detailed e.g. in MEF (2010) and CETI (2008)) gives an idea of the 
complexity of this highly normative issue. Valderrama Torres and Pichihua (2011) discuss 
how to bring the targeting performance of the current SISFOH index closer to that of the 
monetary poverty lines for the case that this were desirable.  
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